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IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR
INVOLUNTARILY CONFINED MENTAL PATIENTS:
WYATT v. STICKNEY

In Wyatt v. Stickney' a federal district court has ordered an
Alabama mental hospital to implement detailed minimum treatment
standards for civilly committed mental patients, standards set forth by
the court as required under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The decision may indicate a trend with important consequences for
states such as New Mexico which at present require adequate
2
treatment only, to the extent that facilities and staff are available.
Federal courts face difficult, but not insurmountable problems in
enforcing a right to treatment. Where state legislatures refuse to
appropriate funds required to meet federally imposed standards,
serious federal-state tensions might arise. But if state legislatures take
the initiative by establishing administrative machinery to enforce the
right to treatment, such problems can be minimized. The states will
have a much greater voice in determining the specific details of
adequate treatment than they would if such standards were imposed
by federal courts.
3

BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT DOCTRINE
In 1960 Morton Birnbaum argued 4 that an involuntarily confined
mental patient has a right to receive adequate treatment under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He suggested that
confinement without adequate treatment amounts to imprisonment,
and is therefore a denial of substantive due process, since the inmate
has committed no crime.
Such a right to treatment has not been generally recognized in
1. 344 Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Two earlier decisions in the same case are Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) and Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971). These will be referred to respectively as Wyatt I, II and III.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §34-2-13 (1953) requires high quality medical treatment "'to the extent
that facilities, equipment and personnel are available."
3. See, generally, Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Katz, The Right
to Treatment-An 'Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1969); Bazelon,
Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742 (1969); GuaranteeingTreatmentfor
the Committed Mental Patient: The Troubled Enforcement of an Elusive Right, 32 Md. L. Rev.
42 (1972); Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 587
(1972).

4. Id.
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American law. It has usually been held that a state merely has a duty
to use reasonable care to protect a mental patient from injury.5
Judicial support for the right to treatment doctrine stems from the
opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in the
1966 case of Rouse v. Cameron.6 Rouse had been acquitted of a
criminal charge on grounds of insanity, and was then involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital for an indefinite period. Later he filed
a habeas corpus petition, claiming that he was receiving no psychiatric treatment. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that
it had no jurisdiction to consider whether his treatment was adequate,
but only whether he had recovered his sanity.
In an opinion by Judge Bazelon, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that since the purpose of such confinement is treatment, the
patient has a right to treatment. The court said that failure to provide
treatment may violate due process, and held that a bona fide effort
must be made to provide treatment adequate to the patient's
particular needs, in light of present medical knowledge. 7
The constitutional nature of the holding was obscured somewhat,
since the decision was rendered under the District of Columbia
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, which provides that a patient
"shall . . . be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment." 8 But the court. did suggest that even without such a statute,
confinement without treatment might violate the Due Process
Clause. 9 The court also said that such confinement might violate the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or
the Equal Protection Clause (by denial of the procedural safeguards
afforded criminal defendants). 1
The court in Rouse also held that failure to provide adequate
treatment cannot be justified by lack of necessary staff or facilities.11
This holding would appear to be based on the constitutional
requirement of adequate treatment. If the adequate treatment
requirement is merely statutory, the fact that the legislature fails to
provide adequate funds might provide the hospital some defense,
since the statutory treatment requirement has no greater force than
the appropriations act. But if the right to treatment is based on the
5. 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §171 (1945). It is generally held that release of a patient may be
ordered only on grounds of improper commitment, or of restoration of sanity. 41 Am. Jur. 2d
Incompetent Persons §44 (1968). Denial of treatment is not recognized as a ground for release.
6. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
7. Id. at 456-57.
8. id. at 453.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 373 F.2d at 456-457 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

Constitution, such a defense is of no avail. In a civil rights case,
Watson v. City of Memphis, 12 the Supreme Court clearly rejected the
notion that implementation of constitutional rights can be limited by
budgetary considerations:
• . . it is obvious that vindication of conceded constitutional
rights cannot be made dependent upon any13theory that it is less
expensive to deny them than to afford them.
In 1969 the District of Columbia Circuit extended the right to
14
treatment doctrine, holding in Covington v. Harris that the hospital
must choose the medically suitable form of treatment which is least
restrictive of the patient's personal liberties.
Judge Bazelon has subsequently defended his constitutional argument in Rouse by arguing that society may not deprive persons of
liberty for the humane purpose of treatment unless treatment is in
fact provided:
If society confines a man for the benevolent purpose of helping
him-"for his own good," in the standard phrase-then its right to
so withhold his freedom depends entirely on whether help is in
fact provided. 15
Support for a constitutional right to treatment can also be found in
dicta in a 1968 Massachusetts case, Nason v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hospital,16 in which the Court stated:
confinement of mentally ill persons, not found guilty of a crime,
without affording them reasonable treatment also raises serious
7
questions of deprivation of liberty without due process of law.'
The constitutional argument for a right to treatment is strengthened by the fact that confinement without adequate treatment has
demonstrably harmful effects. As one observer noted, there is
considerable evidence that ". . . prolonged confinement is an institution providing only custodial confinement . . . may itself cause
serious psychological harm or exacerbate any pre-existing condition."' 8 It has been widely noted that patients involuntarily confined
in custodial "warehouses" tend to lose all hope for recovery, and
there is evidence that this loss of hope has harmful psychological and
12. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
13. Id. at 537.
14. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
15. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742, 748 (1969).
16. 233 N.E. 2d 908 (1968).
17. Id. at 913.
18. 32 Md. L. Rev. 42, 51 (1972); see also, U.S. ex rel Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1079
(2d Cir. 1969).
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physical effects. The overall death rate among involuntary mental
patients in the United States is approximately ten times that of the
general population. 19
Increasing awareness of the frequently harmful effects of confinement may lead to more stringent requirements for involuntary
commitment. Since confinement without adequate treatment amounts
to imprisonment, why shouldn't the prospective mental patient have
the procedural safeguards that would be available to him were he
accused of a crime?
The courts seem to be moving toward the position that a patient
may not be committed to a mental hospital for an indefinite period
without first being given the procedural safeguards afforded criminal
defendants. In Lessard v. Schmidt, 20 a suit was filed under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Civil Commitment Statute, which allowed involuntary commitment for up to
145 days. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional for
failure to afford the patient safeguards of the type given criminal
defendants, including a right to counsel from the outset of the
commitment proceedings, and a right to a Miranda type warning that
statements made to a psychiatrist might be used as a basis for
commitment.
The state argued that because the patient has a constitutional right
to treatment, less stringent commitment procedures could be followed than those applied in criminal cases. It reasoned that by
involving the right to treatment, patients may insure that their
confinement will not amount to imprisonment; therefore the criminal
law analogy should not be applied. The argument was 21rejected
because of the difficulties in enforcing the right to treatment.
Noting the frequently harmful effects of commitment, including the
death statistics cited above, the court concluded:
The interests in avoiding civil commitment are at least as high as
those of persons accused of criminal offenses. The resulting burden
on the22 state to justify civil commitment must be correspondingly
high.
Support for the Lessard holding is provided by a recent Supreme
Court decision on a related issue. In Jackson v. Indiana23 the court
struck down an Indiana statute which allowed indefinite commitment
of a criminal defendant who is incompetent to stand trial. The court
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 1086-1087.
Id. at 1090.
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing
to give the defendant at least the safeguards and opportunities for
release provided under the ordinary civil commitment procedures for
persons not charged with crimes.2 4 The court also held that indefinite
commitment solely on account of incapacity to stand trial violates
due process, and that the state must either institute ordinary civil
commitment proceedings or else release the defendant. 25
Since the Supreme Court has held that the criminal defendant
found incompetent to stand trial is entitled to the same protections
provided mental patients not charged with crimes, it would not seem
unlikely that the court might extend such reasoning and hold that
mental patients generally are entitled to at least the procedural
protections provided for criminal defendants.
There is a common thread running through the right to treatment
decisions and decisions like Lessard on commitment procedures. First
there is an awareness that mental hospitals without adequate
treatment are essentially prisons, and that the law must do something
to correct the situation. Here a basic choice is presented as to what
the law may do:
1. Recognize that mental hospitals are prisons, by instituting
commitment procedures modeled after criminal procedures.
Lessard, supra. or,
2. Make mental hospitals be hospitals instead of prisons, by
enforcing a right to adequate treatment. Rouse, Wyatt.
There are at least two major difficulties with the first choice. First, it
strongly implies that present inadequate treatment will be allowed
to continue. Second, it is simply not possible to effectively implement
criminal procedure safeguards in commitment proceedings. How can
an insane person effectively cooperate with counsel, or knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to remain silent in the psychiatric
interview, Lessard, supra? If we are really to apply the criminal
analogy as Lessard suggests, does not the commitment proceeding
become a trial? Isn't the patient incompetent to stand trial if his
mental condition is such that he should be committed? If an
incompetent person were charged with assault, the patient would not
be tried on the criminal charge while incompetent. Yet a Lessard type
commitment hearing could send him to a "mental prison" for an
indefinite period. Has he really been given the safeguards afforded
criminal defendants?
For these reasons it is suggested that the second choice, implemen24. Id. at 723-731.
25. Id. at 731-739.

May 1973]

IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO TREA TMENT

tation of the right to adequate treatment, is the more rational and
humane alternative.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE SQUARELY FACED: WYATT I
The first holding that involuntary mental patients have a right to
adequate treatment on purely constitutional grounds came in 1971 in
Wyatt L26 (Subsequent decisions in the same case will be referred to
as Wyatt II and III.) In a class action suit filed by patients in
Alabama's Bryce Hospital, the district court found that treatment
conditions at Bryce did not measure up to any known standards of
medical care. The court then held as follows:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and
then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process. 27
The rationale of the holding was explained by Jack Drake, counsel for
the plaintiffs, as follows:
[W]hen a patient is involuntarily committed through non-criminal
procedures without the constitutional protections afforded to
defendants in criminal actions, he has a constitutional right to
receive individual treatment designed to cure or improve his
mental condition. If he does not receive such treatment, his
an indefinite imprisonment without a
confinement becomes
28
criminal conviction.
Wyatt I followed Rouse, supra, in holding also that failure to provide
adequate treatment could not be justified by lack of staff or
facilities. 29 This holding appears inescapable in view of the Supreme
Court's general position on the issue as set forth in Watson, supra,
that constitutional rights may not be denied on budgetary grounds.
The right to treatment upheld in Wyatt I is purely constitutional
since the decision was reached in a state which does not provide a
right to treatment by statute. The Alabama statute allowed involuntary commitment for either treatment or "safekeeping."-3 0 The term
"safekeeping" refers to the fact that under present case law the state
has a duty merely to protect the patient from physical injury.
Many states, including New Mexico, also fail to provide a statutory
right to treatment. The New Mexico statute 3 ' is taken from the Draft
26.
27.
28.
(1972).
29.
30.
31.

325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Id. at 785.
Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 587
325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Comment, 51 Boston U. L. Rev. 530, 532 (1971).
See note 2 supra.
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Act of the National Institute of Mental Health, which requires
32 The Draft
treatment only to the extent that facilities are available.
33
correct.
I
is
Act may be unconstitutional if Wyatt
WHAT KIND OF TREATMENT IS ADEQUATE?
Assuming that a constitutional right to treatment does exist, a
number of questions immediately arise as to the standardof adequate
treatment and how the standard should be determined and applied in
particular situations.
Must the required treatment be tailored to the specific needs of the
individual patient, or is the proper criterion the general level of care
received by the average patient? In Rouse, supra, the court held that
the treatment must be adequate for the particular needs of the
individual patient, in light of present medical knowledge. 34 This is the
position the court took in Wyatt I, saying that an adequate treatment
program would ". . . give each of the treatable patients . . . a
realistic opportunity to be cured or improve his or her mental
condition . . ."35 (Emphasis added.) In Wyatt Ill,36 discussed in
detail below, the court emphasized that one of three fundamental
program was failure to
deficiencies of the Bryce Hospital treatment
37
provide individualizedtreatment programs.
But in a Maryland case, Director of Patuxent Institution v.
Daniels,38 the court held that the general level of post commitment
treatment is a sufficient consideration in determining adequacy of
treatment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this position
in another Maryland case, Tippett v. State of Maryland,39 and held
that the commitment act was constitutional as applied. The court
noted, however, that the treatment program at the institution in
question was substantially funded, with increasing appropriations and
evidence of continuing improvement. Dissenting in part, Judge
Subeloff argued that the court should have considered "not only the
prisoner
general treatment program, but whether the particular
40
before the court is receiving the benefits of the program."
32. National Institute of Mental Health & Office of General Counsel, Public Health Service
Publication No. 51, Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill 14-15 (rev. Sept.
1952).
33. 32 Md. L. Rev. 42, 65 (1972).
34. 373 F.2d at 456-457.
35. 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
36. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
37. Id. at 375.
38. 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
39. 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. granted 92 S. Ct. 567 (1971), writ of certiorari
dismissed as improvidently granted, 407 U.S. 355, 92 S. Ct. 2091, 32 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1972).
40. 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971).
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4
In oral argument before the Supreme Court the state pursued the
general level of treatment approach, arguing that the treatment
program was adequate on the basis that there is a much lower
recidivism rate among those released from Patuxent than among
convicts released from prisons in the state. But the Supreme Court did
not reach the issue, instead dismissing the writ of certiorari as
substantial revision
improvidently granted, in view of the continuing
42
statutes.
commitment
civil
Maryland
of the
The Daniels-Tippett general treatment or average patient approach
has been criticized as "neglecting totally the most crucial aspects of
the right to treatment-the duty imposed on the institution to afford
43
each patient appropriate therapy." The Rouse-Wyatt individual
patient approach seems to be constitutionally a sounder one. It is
difficult to see how a given patient's constitutional right to adequate
treatment is satisfied by treatment which helps the average patient,
but fails to help the particular patient whose rights are before the
court.
But if the particular needs approach of Rouse and Wyatt is
followed, what about the patient who is believed to be dangerous, but
for whom no treatment is presently known, or the patient who refuses
treatment? Of course it should be noted that 90% of patients in
44
American mental hospitals are believed to be harmless to others,
and untreatable patients in this category could be ordered released.
As to the dangerous untreatable patient, it can be argued that as long
as society makes a continuing effort to find a new method of
treatment, the confinement can be justified as necessary for the
protection of others. But continuing evaluation of such a patient
should be required, so that he could be released if it is determined
that he is no longer dangerous to others. As to the patient who refuses
treatment, it can be argued that continual confinement is justified if
necessary to protect society, particularly since there is always a
chance the patient will change his mind and accept treatment.
The general versus particular treatment issue is one of the crucial
problems which the courts must resolve in implementing the right to
treatment. Another important question is whether courts will enforce
detailed compliance with judicially proclaimed standards, or whether
an administrative law approach will be followed, resulting in much
less judicial intervention in the operation of mental hospitals.
41. 40 U.S.L.W. 3477 (April 4, 1972).
42. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 92 S. Ct. 2091, 32 L. Ed. 2d 791

(1972).
43. 32 Md. L. Rev. 42, 52 (1972).
44. Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 Am. J. Psychiatry

1458, 1459 (1967).
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A FEDERAL COURT DECREES DETAILED STANDARDS
OF MINIMUM TREATMENT: WYATT III
In Wyatt I the court gave the hospital 6 months to implement an
adequate treatment program. 4 5 In Wyatt 11,46 the court found that the
hospital had not met the deadline, but found that the hospital officials
were acting in good faith, and therefore allowed more time for
compliance.
In Wyatt 1I1, 4 7 the district court formulated highly specific,
detailed minimum treatment standards which it held to be constitutionally required. These were based on three main requisites of a
constitutionally adequate program:
(1)a humane psychological and physical environment;
(2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate
treatment; and
(3) individualized treatment plans. 48
The court held that a suitable environment must include the least
restrictive form of treatment consistent with the goals of treatment, 49
thus following the rule of the District of Columbia Circuit in
Covington v. Harris,supra.
To aid it in fashioning detailed standards, the court held a hearing
at which testimony was presented by leading authorities on mental
health from all over the United States. 50 On the basis of the expert
testimony and supporting briefs the court formulated standards which
it held to be constitutional minimums.
Specific requirements for adequate treatment imposed in Wyatt III
include the following: 5 1
(1) A limit of six patients per room, with at least 80 square feet
of space per patient. There will be at least one toilet for each
eight patients and one tub or shower for each 15 patients.
(2) Patients to be placed in isolation only upon written order by
a member of the professional staff, and such orders shall be
effective for only 24 hours.
(3) A minimum of 2 psychiatrists, 4 medical doctors and 12
registered nurses for each 250 patients.
(4) In order that patients be free of unnecessary medication, all
medication must be by written order of a physician, and all.
prescriptions shall terminate in not more than 30 days.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
344 F. Supp 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
Id. at 375.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 375-376.
Id. at 379-386.
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(5) Patients have a right to be outdoors at frequent intervals,
and a right to physical exercise several times a week.
(6) Patients shall engage in hospital maintenance work only on a
voluntary basis, and only if paid the minimum wage.
(7) Patients shall have the same visitation rights as patients at
other hospitals, except where a member of the professional staff
imposes a limitation, by written order, based upon treatment
requirements of the individual patient.
(8) Each patient shall have a detailed individual treatment plan
prepared by the professional staff.
(9) Complete records shall be kept for each patient, including a
detailed weekly summary of each patient's progress.
(10) Educational opportunities shall be provided for patients
who are children or young adults, suitable to the educational
needs of the individual patients.
(11) A patient's individual treatment plan must be prepared and
initiated within fifteen days of admission; otherwise the patient
must be released.
In addition a number of other less significant requirements were
outlined. The court appointed a human rights committee as its agent
to supervise implementation of the standards. It also reiterated its
earlier holding that lack of funds would not justify failure to comply
with the standards, and 52appealed to the Alabama Legislature to
provide the needed funds.
Wyatt IH has proposed a detailed constitutional standard of
adequate treatment which obviously would have far reaching impact
if the decision becomes generally accepted. But the specific requirements may be unrealistic. A knowledgeable staff member of the
Bernalillo County New Mexico Mental Health Center has informed
the author that in his opinion no state mental hospital can meet the
Wyatt standards, particularly the staffing requirements, without a
large increase in operating funds.
Wyatt is also subject to criticism and its precedential value
weakened by the lack of adversary process in the development of the
case. In Wyatt I the existence of a constitutional right to 3treatment
5
was admitted by defense counsel in their pre-trial brief. And the
court's description of the testimony from which its standards were
developed suggests that the experts who testified more or less agreed
to support standards of the type which resulted. The history of the
case suggests that the defendants were eager to lose, hoping for a
court order to improve hospital conditions, and thereby secure a lever
for obtaining needed funds from the legislature. It is at least
52. Id. at 378.
53. 10Am. Crim. Law Rev. 587, 596 n. 30(1972).
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questionable whether a decision of such far reaching implications will
be sustained in view of the collusive development of the issues.
Professor Wright has observed, however, that some of the most famous
constitutional cases have been decided in circumstances suggesting
collusion, although the rule against collusive cases is supposedly of
54
general application.
POTENTIALLY BETTER APPROACH THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Enforcement of Wyatt type standards by the federal courts could
lead to serious tensions in the federal system particularly if state
legislatures are reluctant to appropriate the needed funds. This is
shown by the further remedies requested by plaintiffs in Wyatt,
remedies on which the Court reserved action in Wyatt III:
(I) Appointment of a federal master and advisory committee to
take over operation of the hospital. The Court warned that this
would be done if the defendants did not comply with its treatment
standards. 55
56
(2) Injunction against further admissions.
(3) Injunction against non essential state expenditures.
or encumber
(4) An order that the Mental Health Board sell
57
portions of its land holdings to raise needed funds.
These are extreme measures, which federal courts would obviously
resort to with great reluctance, and only when required for the
protection of federal constitutional rights.
Such problems may be avoided to some extent if state legislatures
will take the initiative by establishing administrative procedures to
protect the right to treatment. A promising approach was presented
in a right to treatment bill introduced in the Pennsylvania Legislature
in 1968.58 Although the bill did not pass, its thoughtful approach to
the problem may be indicative of future legislative developments.
The bill proposed creation of a Mental Treatment Standards
Committee, charged with drafting objective minimum treatment
standards, including minimum personnel/patient ratios, professional
personnel qualifications, and minimum frequency of consultation and
examination. A Patient Treatment Review Board, consisting of two
psychiatrists, two medical doctors and one lawyer,. would hear
individual patient complaints regarding deficiencies in treatment.
54. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 36 (1963).
55. 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
56. Id. at 378.
57. Id. at 377.
58. S.B. 1274 & H.B. 2118, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess., discussed in Comment, 15 Vill. L.
Rev. 951, at 967 (1970).
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The decisions of this administrative agency would be subject to
judicial review.
The enactment of such legislation could of course make the job of
the courts far easier. In view of the deference generally shown by
courts toward administrative decisions, it seems unlikely that treatment standards fashioned by a state in this manner would be
overturned by federal courts, unless the procedure used were a mere
sham in an effort, to preserve grossly inadequate conditions of
treatment.
States which follow the administrative law approach may be
strongly influenced by federal administrative standards. The Social
Security Administration has promulgated standards for "active treatment" for hospitals eligible to receive Medicare payments. These
require an individualized treatment plan or diagnostic plan, reasonably expected to improve or help diagnose the patient's condition;
supervision and evaluation by a physician is also required. 59 Hopefully states will not jeopardize federal funding by setting standards
which do not meet federal requirements, or which conflict with them.
THE ULTIMATE SANCTION: RELEASE OF PATIENTS
DENIED THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Where a court is forced to act without the cooperation of the
legislature, there seems to be no reason why release may not be
ordered as a last resort, at least for patients not believed to be
dangerous (which include the great majority).60 The Wyatt III
standards in fact require release where an individual treatment plan
61
has not been initiated within fifteen days of admission.
Release might be ordered for a single patient under habeas corpus.
No state case has been found in which a patient was actually ordered
released, but two recent federal cases have ordered the release of
persons held in federal custody. In United States v. Jackson,6 2 the
defendant was indicted on federal charges of bank robbery. After
being found mentally incompetent to stand trial, he had been
confined in a federal hospital. The court held that because he was still
mentally incompetent, and because Congress had not provided a
program which offered a realistic opportunity for improvement of his
condition, he must be released. The same result was reached in a
similar fact situation in United States v. Walker.63 But in both these
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

20 C.F.R. §§405.1036-1038 (1969).
32 Md. L. Rev. 42, 58 (1972).
344 F. Supp. 373, 386 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
306 F. Supp. 4 (1969).
335 F. Supp. 705 (1971).
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cases the defendants were charged with offenses which were also state
crimes and were released to the custody of state officials.
Jack Drake has pointed out that habeas corpus is a-poor vehicle for
reform of mental hospitals, since even successful litigation may result
only in relief for one patient, while the hospital continues to function
basically unchanged. 64 For this reason it seems likely that Wyatt type
suits will continue to be brought as class actions.
CONCLUSIONS
In Wyatt v. Stickney a federal court has decisively proclaimed the
existence of a constitutional right to adequate treatment, based on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court has
supported its ruling by establishing detailed minimum standards of
care formulated with the aid of expert testimony. The Wyatt
standards will have considerable impact on mental health programs
throughout the country if they become generally accepted.
However, if state legislatures take the initiative by establishing
administrative procedures to enforce the right to treatment, the states
may retain much greater discretion in the area of treatment
standards. Serious federal-state confrontations may thus be avoided.
The existence of a constitutional right to adequate treatment is as
yet highly speculative. Wyatt is the only reported case to date which
has upheld the right on purely constitutional grounds. The author has
learned of two as yet unreported federal district court decisions, one
and one holding that there is no constitutional right
supporting Wyatt
65
to treatment.
It is at least arguable that even if there is a constitutional right to
some treatment, there is no enforceable right to adequate treatment.
In Mclnnis v. Shapiro66 a three-judge federal court rejected a
challenge to the Illinois school funding system, a suit in which the
plaintiffs argued that educational expenditures in each district must
be based solely on educational needs, without regard to the available
property tax revenues in the district. The court held that the concept
67
of educational needs was so vague that the issue was non-justiciable.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed without a written
opinion. If adequacy of educational programs is a non-justiciable
issue, it would seem that adequacy of mental treatment may also be
non-justiciable, since it is at least questionable whether there are
"discoverable and manageable standards" by which a court can
64. 10Am. Crim. L. Rev. 587, 595(1972).
65. Henry Weihofen, private communication. The cases are Donaldson v. O'Connor (N.D.
Fla., Nov. 28, 1972), following Wyatt, and Burnham v. Georgia (N.D. Georgia, 1972), contra.
66. 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968), affd. mem. sub. nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
67. Id. at 335. See also id. at 329 n. 4.
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determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when it is violated. 68
If adequacy of mental treatment is non-justiciable, the right to
treatment may be recognized only as a right to some treatment, a
reasonable level of treatment in light of available resources. Certainly
it would be far easier for a court to decide whether or not a patient is
receiving some treatment than to decide whether the treatment is
adequate.
Clearly the courts must explore these issues more thoroughly before
definitive answers to these questions can emerge.
ROBERT W. HARRIS

68. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964).

